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Abstract
While machine learning is going through an era
of celebrated success, concerns have been raised
about the vulnerability of its backbone: stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD). Recent approaches
have been proposed to ensure the robustness of
distributed SGD against adversarial (Byzantine)
workers sending poisoned gradients during the
training phase. Some of these approaches have
been proven Byzantine–resilient: they ensure the
convergence of SGD despite the presence of a
minority of adversarial workers. We show in this
paper that convergence is not enough. In high
dimension d  1, an adversary can build on
the loss function’s non–convexity to make SGD
converge to ineffective models. More precisely,
we bring to light that existing Byzantine–resilient
schemes leave a margin of poisoning of Ω(f(d)),
where f(d) increases at least like
√
d. Based
on this leeway, we build a simple attack, and
experimentally show its strong to utmost effec-
tivity on CIFAR–10 and MNIST. We introduce
Bulyan, and prove it significantly reduces the at-
tacker’s leeway to a narrow O(1/√d ) bound. We
empirically show that Bulyan does not suffer the
fragility of existing aggregation rules and, at a
reasonable cost in terms of required batch size,
achieves convergence as if only non–Byzantine
gradients had been used to update the model.
1. Introduction
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), is arguably the back-
bone of the most successful machine learning methods (Le-
Cun et al., 2015; Abadi et al., 2016; Dean et al., 2012; Bot-
tou, 1998). Gradient Descent (GD), the underlying princi-
ple of SGD, is so straightforward that, as sometimes said,
“Newton could have invented it in his time”. In particu-
lar, GD relies on a simple observation: given a function
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Q, depending on a parameter x, if one keeps updating x in
the opposite direction of the gradient ofQ, with reasonably
small, but not too small (Bottou, 1998) steps, x eventually
reaches the global minimum if Q is convex or, if Q is not
convex1, reach a region whereQ is either flat or in some lo-
cal minima. SGD is the lightweight version of GD, where
a sample is drawn at random to estimate the gradient of Q.
Beyond image recognition or video labeling for social
networks, SGD–based machine learning is venturing into
safety–critical applications, like health–care (Holzinger,
2016) and transportation (Bojarski et al., 2016). Mean-
while, a growing body of work, coined Adversarial Ma-
chine Learning (Biggio & Roli, 2017; Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Gilmer et al., 2018; Kumar et al., 2017) is unveil-
ing serious vulnerabilities in some of the most performing
algorithms. Essentially, the general effort towards robust
ML is conducted against three kinds of attacks: poison-
ing ones (Biggio & Laskov, 2012; Koh & Liang, 2017)
where an adversary injects poisoned data during the train-
ing phase, exploratory attacks, where a curious attacker at-
tempts to infer privacy–sensitive information, and evasion
attacks, where attackers try to fool an already trained model
with adversarial inputs. The three fronts are complemen-
tary and each kind of attack poses a challenge on its own.
In the context of poisoning attacks, an emerging line of
research looks at robustness through the lenses of (dis-
tributed) optimization (Chen et al., 2017; Su, 2017; Blan-
chard et al., 2017). Interestingly, SGD can be proven to
converge despite the presence of a (bounded) number of
adversaries. The general recipe is to find a robust estima-
tor for the gradient in the presence of adversaries, and to
prefer that estimator over a mere linear combination of the
provided gradients (Dean et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015),
known for not being robust (Rousseeuw, 1985).
To scale, ML implementations are distributed (Abadi et al.,
2016; Dean et al., 2012): several workers collaborate to
compute a gradient, aggregated by a parameter server (Li
et al., 2014a;b). In this context, robustness is even more
important. A bias in the gradient estimation may not only
come from poor sampling or noisy data, but also from
Byzantine (adversarial) workers (Lamport et al., 1982).
1In practically interesting cases such as neural networks, Q is
far from being convex (Choromanska et al., 2015a;b).
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Accordingly, Byzantine–resilient aggregation rules were
derived and proved to guarantee the convergence of SGD
in this context (Chen et al., 2017; Blanchard et al., 2017).
But is convergence enough in the non–convex, high di-
mensional case of neural networks?
In fact, the question of SGD convergence in the case of
neural networks is neither new and unprecedented nor old
and forgotten by the ML community. Last year, it sparked a
hot debate when some, using timely examples, were blam-
ing SGD to be “brittle”2. Others moderated that view, re-
minding us how blaming neural networks for their lack of
(provable) convergence led the community to “threw the
baby with the bathwater back in the 1990s”3; which ar-
guably slowed research progress in the understanding of
neural networks as a learning machine.
We show in the paper that convergence is not enough. We
look at the question from the robust distributed optimiza-
tion point of view, where some workers can be Byzantine
and we show that, whilst indeed neural networks usually
benefit from the existence of many “similarly good” local
minima (Choromanska et al., 2015a), making SGD conver-
gence a preferable requirement is clearly not sufficient in a
Byzantine distributed setting. More precisely, we show that
a single Byzantine worker can make any known Byzantine-
resilient aggregation rule for SGD learn ineffectual models.
It is important to note that we do not contradict the proof
of convergence of these rules. We rather take advantage
of the high dimensional and highly non–convex landscape
of the loss function to make these rules converge, as they
were proven to, but to ineffectual models. We provide an
analytic understanding of how attackers could benefit from
this curse of dimensionality, and propose a solution that en-
hances the Byzantine–resilience of SGD.
To start feeling the vulnerability, consider any Byzantine–
resilient gradient aggregation rule based on a distance crite-
ria. When the distance criteria relies solely on norms in the
`p categories, with a small p (the Euclidean or `1 norms),
a Byzantine gradient can both remain close to honest gra-
dients and have one of its coordinates poisoned, e.g. set to
a large value. These poisoned coordinates can take values
on the order of Ω( p
√
d ), a large order given the dimension
d of modern neural networks. And the gradient would still
be seen as “legitimate” by the aggregation rule. Inversely,
when the distance criteria involves norms closer to the infi-
nite norm, the Byzantine worker can poison every coordi-
nates while being exactly on the value that the aggregation
rule will decide on. This way, the Byzantine worker can
drive the aggregation to converge, but to the worst possi-
ble sub–optimum that the Ω( p
√
d ) (`p norm) or the Ω(d)
2Ali Rahimi, Test of Time Award Lecture. NIPS 2017.
3Yann LeCun. “My Take on Ali Rahimi’s Test of Time Award
Talk at NIPS 2017”. https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/
˜tzhao80/Yann_Response.pdf
(infinite norm) margins enable it to get. See section 3.1.
Given any Byzantine–resilient ruleA, we propose a generic
enhancement recipe we call Bulyan of A, or simply
Bulyan(A), that improves Byzantine–resilience in the fol-
lowing sense: if the vectors selected by A are in a cone of
angle α around the true gradient, then the vectors selected
by Bulyan(A) are in a cone of angle α′ ≤ α. Most im-
portantly, we prove that Bulyan(A) drastically reduces the
leeway of Byzantine workers to a narrow O(1/√d ) bound.
We also empirically evaluate the trade–offs induced by
Bulyan, and compare its convergence speed with those of
other aggregation rules. In particular, we show that with
typically used values for the batch size, Bulyan is compara-
ble to the speed of averaging (the fastest aggregation rule),
which does not stand a single Byzantine worker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the model of distributed SGD with Byzantine
workers, and recalls Byzantine–resilient gradient aggrega-
tion rules. Section 3 introduces our attack and analytically
discusses how it affects the aforementioned gradient aggre-
gation rules. Section 4 describes our algorithm, Bulyan,
and proves our two main theoretical results. Section 5 high-
lights the practical impacts of our attack, and the beneficial
effects of Bulyan on MNIST and CIFAR–10. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes by discussing related and future work.
The code used to carry our experiments out (includ-
ing additional ones asked by reviewers) is available at
https://github.com/LPD-EPFL/bulyan.
2. Model
2.1. Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (DSGD)
We follow the usual parameter server model used in dis-
tributed implementations of machine learning (Dean et al.,
2012; Li et al., 2014a;b). The system consists in n+ 1 pro-
cesses: 1 master and n workers. There are f ≤ n Byzan-
tine, i.e. adversarial, workers. Their role and capability are
described in Section 2.2.
Let t be the current epoch, and xt be the model parameters,
letQ be the cost function we aim to minimize. Each honest
worker i ∈ {1, . . . , n − f} draws i.i.d. (mini–batches of)
samples ξti from the data set to compute an estimate V
t
i =
G(xt, ξ
t
i) of the gradient∇Q(xt).
We assume that ∇Q is K–Lipschtiz and that Q is three–
times differentiable. We also assume that G has a bounded
variance σ, i.e. Eξ‖G(x, ξ) − ∇Q(x)‖2 ≤ σ2, and as
assumed in (Bottou, 1998; Blanchard et al., 2017), for
r ∈ { 1, . . . , 4 }, the r–th statistical moments of G does
not overgrow the r–th powers of the model:
∃ (Ar, Br) ∈ (R+)2, Eξ‖G(x, ξ)‖r ≤ Ar +Br‖x‖r
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Figure 1. A view on the master and a worker X. The most impor-
tant pieces of information each party hold, along with the com-
munication protocol (COMPUTE and SUBMIT), are represented.
2.2. Adversary
The adversary in this model is an entity which controls f of
the nworkers. These adversarial workers, and the gradients
they send, are called Byzantine. The goal of the adversary is
to prevent the distributed SGD process from converging to
a satisfying state. Ideally, a satisfying state with Byzantine
workers should achieve an accuracy that is comparable to
the one achieved without any Byzantine worker, all other
things being equal; e.g. see Figure 4.
The adversary is omniscient, in the sense that it has a per-
fect knowledge of the system state at any time. The system
state is constituted exhaustively by:
• the full state of the master (data and code)
• the full state of every worker (data and code)
• any data exchanged over any communication channel
Hence the adversary can leverage its knowledge of the mas-
ter’s state and the submitted gradients to build powerful
attacks, as shown in sections 3.2 and 3.3. However, the
adversary is not omnipotent. It cannot directly modify the
state of the system, impersonate other workers, or delay
communications. The adversary is only allowed to submit
gradients via its f workers.
2.3. Gradient aggregation rules (GAR)
In this section, we describe the three studied gradient ag-
gregation rule. A GAR transforms the workers’ submitted
gradients into a single, aggregated one. This aggregated
gradient is then used to update the model parameters.
A very commonly used aggregation rule is averag-
ing (Abadi et al., 2016), which has several variants (Zhang
et al., 2015) that are also linear combinations. Yet linear
combinations all have one major flaw: they give the adver-
sary, described in Section 2.2, full control of the aggregated
gradient (and hence of the model parameters), as proven in
(Blanchard et al., 2017).
Contrary to linear combinations, the GARs studied here are
all proven Byzantine-resilient in the sense of Definition 1
introduced in (Blanchard et al., 2017).
All the expected values E in the following definition and
the rest of this paper denote expectations when the source
of randomness is the mini-sample ξ1 · · · ξn−f drawn i.i.d
by the honest workers.
Definition 1 ((α, f)–Byzantine–resilience).
Let (α, f) ∈ [0, pi/2] × {0, . . . , n} be any (angle, integer),
let n ∈ N with n > f , let (V1 . . . Vn−f ) ∈
(
Rd
)n−f
be
independent, identically distributed random vectors, with
Vi ∼ G and E[G] = G, and let (B1 . . . Bf ) ∈
(
Rd
)f
be
random vectors, possibly dependent between them and the
vectors (V1 . . . Vn−f ). Then, an aggregation rule F is said
to be (α, f)-Byzantine-resilient if, for any 1 ≤ j1 < · · · <
jf ≤ n, the vector:
F = F(V1, . . . , B1︸︷︷︸
j1
, . . . , Bf︸︷︷︸
jf
, . . . , Vn)
satisfies:
1. 〈E[F ] , G〉 ≥ (1− sinα) · ‖G‖2 > 0
2. ∀r ∈ { 2, 3, 4 } , E ‖F‖r is bounded above by a linear
combination of the terms E ‖G‖r1 · . . . · E ‖G‖rn−1 ,
with r1 + · · ·+ rn−1 = r.
Note that the reasoning on expectation holds on the ran-
domness due the ξ samples used to estimate a gradient,
the “S” (stochastic) of SGD. Our expectation is not on be-
haviors of the Byzantine worker, on which we perform a
worst case analysis, as should be done in the context of
a any safety-critical analysis necessary for Byzantine fault
tolerance. Points 1. and 2. of this definition are not arbi-
trary choices: these serve as assumptions for the global
confinement proof of (Bottou, 1998). Hence, an (α, f)–
Byzantine–resilient aggregation rule is guaranteed to pro-
duce gradients which will make the SGD process converge.
2.3.1. BRUTE
The Brute GAR requires that n ≥ 2f + 1. Informally, it
selects the n − f most clumped gradients among the sub-
mitted ones, and average them as final output. It is rem-
iniscent of the Minimal Volume Ellipsoid estimator, intro-
duced by (Rousseeuw, 1985), and proven to have the opti-
mal breakdown point of 50%.
Formally, let (n, f) ∈ N2 with n ≥ 2f + 1, let
(V1 . . . Vn−f ) ∈
(
Rd
)n−f
be independent, identically dis-
tributed random vectors, with Vi ∼ G and E[G] = G,
let (B1 . . . Bf ) ∈
(
Rd
)f
be random vectors, possibly de-
pendent between them and the vectors (V1 . . . Vn−f ), let
Q = {V1 . . . Vn } be the set of submitted gradients, let
R = {X | X ⊂ Q, |X | = n− f } be the set of all the
subsets of Q with a cardinality of n − f , and let S =
arg min
X∈R
(
max
(Vi,Vj)∈X 2
(
‖Vi − Vj‖p
))
.
Then, the aggregated gradient is given by F = 1n−f
∑
G∈S
G.
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Since we use Brute as a benchmark when experimenting
with small amount of workers, in Section 5.2.1, we also
prove its (α, f)–Byzantine–resilience. The full proof is
available in the supplementary material, Section A.
As a side note, this rule can hardly be used in practical
cases, as |R| = n!f ! (n−f)! . For instance, with n = 57 work-
ers and f = 27, we have |R| ≈ 1.4 · 1016. Even with
109 measured subsets X per second, aggregating these 57
gradients would take more than 5 months.
2.3.2. KRUM
The Krum GAR requires that n ≥ 2f + 3. It is defined
in (Blanchard et al., 2017) as follows. Let (V1, . . . , Vn) be
the n ≥ 2f + 3 received gradient, among which at most f
are Byzantine gradients. For i 6= j, let i → j denote the
fact that Vj belongs to the n − f − 2 closest vectors to Vi.
Finally, let s (Vi) =
∑
i→j ‖Vi − Vj‖2p be the score of Vi.
Then, Krum outputs the vector Vk with the lowest score.
The (α, f)–Byzantine–resilience of Krum is proven by its
authors, in the original paper (Blanchard et al., 2017).
2.3.3. THE GEOMETRIC MEDIAN(S) - GEOMED
The third and last gradient aggregation rule we consider is
the geometric median (Rousseeuw, 1985). The exact ge-
ometric median is known to suffer from computational is-
sues but can be approximated (Cohen et al., 2016). While
we know from (Rousseeuw, 1985) that the Median has an
optimal breakdown of 0.5, i.e, n ≥ 2f + 1, it is not known
however what would be α such that the Median is (α, f)-
Byzantine-resilient. Empirically (Blanchard et al., 2017)
and theoretically (Chen et al., 2017), variants of the Me-
dian were considered as GAR candidates. In particular, the
Medoid, which is any minimizer among the proposed vec-
tors of the sum of distances, can be used as a GAR and is
easier to compute. Since there can be many minimizers,
we will simply call GeoMed the Medoid of the proposed
vectors with the smallest index.
3. Effective attack on `p norm–based GARs
In this section, we describe a simple, yet effective attack
passing the Byzantine–resilient GARs, such as the ones
presented in Section 2.3. Actually, any `p-norm based
GAR, where the chosen vector is the result of a distance
minimization scheme, is affected.
3.1. Intuition
In high dimensions, the distance function, between two
vectors ‖X − Y ‖p, cannot answer this core question: do
X and Y “disagree” a bit on each coordinate, or do they
disagree a lot on only one? SGD has proven its ability to
accommodate “small errors” from the gradient estimation.
Such “errors” are often beneficial, as they may allow the
descent process to leave sub–optimal local minima (Bot-
tou, 2012). In Byzantine–free distributed setups, gradient
estimations “disagree” a bit on each coordinate4.
In a vector space of dimension d  1, the “bit of dis-
agreement” on each coordinate translates into a distance
‖X − Y ‖p = O( p
√
d ). For the omniscient adversary de-
scribed in Section 2.2, it translates into an opportunity to
submit f Byzantine gradients that “disagree” a lot, as much
as O( p√d ), on only one coordinate with at least one non–
Byzantine gradient. As the `p norm cannot answer the core
question mentioned in the above paragraph, such Byzantine
gradient could then be selected by a `p norm–based GAR.
Each gradient aggregation rule presented in Section 2.3
performs a linear combination of the selected gradient(s).
Thus the final aggregated gradient might have one unex-
pectedly high coordinate. Depending on the learning rate
(Figure 4), updating the model with such gradient may
push and keep the parameter vector in a sub–space rarely
reached with the usual, Byzantine–free distributed setup.
The experiments gathered in Section 5.2.1 clearly show this
dependency on the learning rate, and indicate that this sub–
space only offers sub–optimal to utterly ineffective models.
3.2. Attack on the finite norm, p ≥ 1
The adversary defined in Section 2.2 is omniscient and has
arbitrary fast computation and transmission throughput. So
for each round, every time the n − f non–Byzantine gra-
dients, are produced, the adversary reads them and chooses
the other f gradients the master receives. Based on that
capability, for each round, the adversary waits for n − f
non–Byzantine gradients to be received. Then it attacks.
Formally, let Q = {V1 . . . Vn−f } be the set of submitted,
non–Byzantine gradients, with ∀i ∈ [1 .. n− f ] , Vi ∈ Rd.
Let E = (0 . . . 0, 1, 0 . . . 0) ∈ Rd be any coordinate to at-
tack, and let B (γ) = 1n−f
(∑
V ∈Q V
)
+ γ E. By a simple
linear regression, we estimate the highest value of γ, noted
γm, such that B = B (γm) is selected by the aggregation
rule. Finally, B is submitted by every Byzantine worker.
For each presented GAR, we reveal a relation between
a rough estimation of γm and a few hyper–parameters.
We study these approximations of γm within the minimal
quorum cases, where the proportion of Byzantine work-
ers is maximized, respectively: n = 2f + 1 for Brute
and n = 2f + 3 for Krum/GeoMed. The full details
of the approximations are available in the supplementary
material, sections B.2 and B.3. We denote by δ¯ the av-
erage folded standard deviation on each coordinate of G,
and with p, q constants: γm = O(δ¯ p
√
d ) for Brute, and
4This has been observed during the experiments.
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γm = O(δ¯ q
√
f p
√
d ) for Krum/GeoMed. The added de-
pendence in q
√
f for Krum/GeoMed comes from the shape
of the score function, which naturally decreases the score
of the Byzantine gradients as they all are identical.
As a side–note, an adversary does not necessarily need
to know the submitted, non–Byzantine gradients Q with
this attack. Indeed non–Byzantine gradients are assumed
to be unbiased, so by the law of large numbers we have:
lim|Q|→+∞ B (γ) = E[G] + γ E. It indicates that, for this
attack to succeed as well, the adversary may only need to
compute an unbiased gradient estimate by itself (without
the need to “spy” on the other workers) then add γ E to it.
3.3. Attack on the infinite norm
In the previous subsection, we have seen that γm vary as
p
√
d . Yet, with d  1 fixed: limp→+∞ p
√
d = 1. Basi-
cally, the curse of dimensionality exploited in the attack of
Section 3.2 no longer exists with p large enough, or infinite.
One effective attack in the case of an infinite norm is sim-
ply to change the vectorE = (0 . . . 0, 1, 0 . . . 0) introduced
in the previous subsection for E = (1 . . . 1). The idea is
that modifying non–maximal coordinates of a given vector
does not substantially affect5 the distance to the unbiased
gradient for the modified vector. From this change on E,
we proceed as in the previous subsection.
4. Bulyan
In addition to being Byzantine–resilient in the sense that it
ensures convergence, our algorithm, Bulyan6, also ensures
that each coordinate is agreed on by a majority of vectors7
that were selected by a Byzantine–resilient aggregation rule
A. This ruleA can for example be Brute, Krum, a Medoid,
the geometric median or any other Byzantine–resilient rule
based on an `p norm or the infinite norm.
Let A be any (α, f)-Byzantine–resilient aggregation rule.
Bulyan(A ) requires n ≥ 4f + 3 received gradients in two
steps. The first one is to recursively use A to select θ =
n− 2f gradients, namely:
1. With A, choose, among the proposed vectors, the
closest one to A’s output; for Krum or the Medoid,
this would be the exact output of A.
2. Remove the chosen gradient from the “received set”,
and add it to the “selection set”, noted S.
3. Loop back to step 1 if |S| < θ, with |·| the cardinality.
5It may not affect the infinite norm at all for small–enough γ.
6Bulyan, Ilyan or more commonly, Julian count of Ceuta, was
a Byzantine general, stationed in north Africa, who betrayed the
Byzantine empire, in this sense, he was “Byzantine to the Byzan-
tines”.
7Agreed through the gradients they submitted, of course.
With n ≥ 4f + 3, we ensure that there is a quorum of
workers, i.e. 2f + 3, for each use of A.
Since θ = n−2f ≥ 2f+3, this selection S = (S1 . . . Sθ)
contains a majority of non–Byzantine gradients. Hence for
each i ∈ [1 .. d], the median of the θ coordinates i of the
selected gradients is always bounded by coordinates from
non–Byzantine submissions. With β = θ − 2f ≥ 3,
the second step is to generate the resulting gradient G =
(G[1] . . . G[d]), so that for each of its coordinates G[·]:
∀i ∈ [1 .. d] , G[i] = 1β
∑
X∈M[i]
X[i]
where: M[i] = arg min
R⊂S, |R|=β
( ∑
X∈R
|X[i]−median[i]|
)
and: median[i] = arg min
m=Y[i], Y ∈S
( ∑
Z∈S
|Z[i]−m|
)
.
Simply stated: each i-th coordinate of G is equal to the
average of the β closest i-th coordinates to the median i-th
coordinate of the θ selected gradients.
Let C be the computational cost of running A for each
epoch at the master to aggregate the gradients.
Proposition 1. (Cost of one Bulyan(A ) aggregation.)
(1) The average computational complexity of Bulyan(A ) is
O((n− 2 f) C + dn) for each epoch on the master.
(2) If A is GeoMed or Krum, this cost is O(n2d).
Proof. (1) We iterateA as much as θ = n−2 f times to get
the selected vectors, then we run quick–select to get each
median component (O(n) on each coordinate, i.e. O(dn)
times) and another quick–select to get the β closest coordi-
nates (another O(dn)). Note: we use quick–select instead
of quick–sort since we do not need ordered values, just the
set of the β closest values.
For point (2) of the proposition, in fact, if we know
more about how A is performed, we can get rid of the
n − 2 f multiplications when iterating A: concretely, A
relies on distance computations between proposed vectors,
when we iterate it in the same epoch, we do not need to
re-compute those distances and would amortize the cost.
For instance, for Krum or GeoMed, Bulyan(Krum) and
Bulyan(GeoMed) have a cost of O(n2d+ nd). In modern
machine learning, the models are very large, and d  n
holds. Therefore Bulyan runs in the same O(n2d) of the
base GAR rule it is using8.
Byzantine Leeway Reduction by Bulyan.
In the introduction of this paper and in Section 3, we ex-
plained that the curse of dimensionality leaves the Byzan-
tine worker, at a coordinate i, with a margin of Ω(f(d))
8For more comparison, averaging (which is not Byzantine–
resilient) already has a cost of O(dn).
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computed as the difference between the Byzantine pro-
posed i-th coordinate and the honest proposed vectors’ i-
th coordinates. In what follows, we prove that any vec-
tor produced by Bulyan is constrained, in each coordinate,
to remain within O
(
σ√
d
)
of honest workers’ coordinates.
Therefore, narrowing the aforementioned margin to the de-
sired O
(
1√
d
)
.
Proposition 2. Denote by But the vector chosen by
Bulyan(A ) at round t. Then for any dimension i ∈ [1, d]
and any honest worker k proposing gradient gk, we have
E|But[i]− gk[i]| = O
(
σ√
d
)
.
Proof. Let ξ = (ξ1, · · · , ξn−f ) denote the random (n−f )-
tupple of samples used by the honest workers. By assump-
tion, the ξk, k = 1 · · ·n − f , are assumed to be i.i.d. Let
i ∈ [1 .. d] be any component. We denote by B any vec-
tor that is selected by Buylan(A) in the setM[i] (i.e, B[i]
scores among the β closest values to median[i]). Let k be
any honest worker proposing gradient gk, since B was se-
lected by Bulyan, then B[i] is among the closest β propo-
sitions to median[i]. We know that median[i] is the the
median coordinate of θ ≥ 2 f + 3 propositions, and we
know that β = θ−2 f therefore, all the setM[i] is closer to
median[i] than at least 2 f other propositions, in particular,
on each side of median[i] (we are in a single dimension)
there are at least f workers who are farther frommedian[i]
than is any B[i]. Therefore, there are at least two different
honest workers, call them l and r whose i-th coordinates
are respectively on the left and on the right of the B[i], for
every B inM[i], i.e, gl[i] ≤ B[i] ≤ gr[i]. There are three
cases:
1) gk[i] ∈ ]−∞, gl[i]], then |B[i]− gk[i] | < |gl[i]− gk[i] |
2) gk[i] ∈ ]gl[i] , gr[i][, then |B[i]− gk[i] | < |gl[i]− gr[i] |
3) gk[i] ∈ [gr[i] ,+∞[, then |B[i]− gk[i] | < |gr[i]− gk[i] |
Denote by Ih the indicator function of each of the three
situations h = 1, 2, 3, i.e. Ih = 1 only if we are in case h,
and Ih = 0 otherwise. Then we have the following bound:
|B[i]− gk[i]| < I1 |gl[i]− gk[i]|+ I2 |gl[i]− gr[i]|
+ I3 |gr[i]− gk[i]|
Let B1, · · · , Bβ be the β elements of M[i], the previous
inequality holds for every Bh, denote by Ir,h, r = 1 . . . 3
the corresponding indicator functions for each h, we have:
|But[i]− gk[i]| ≤ 1
β
β∑
h=1
|Bh[i]− gk[i]|
≤ 1
β
β∑
h=1
(I1,h |gl[i]− gk[i]|
+ I2,h |gl[i]− gr[i]| +I3,h |gr[i]− gk[i]|)
Since gl, gr and gr are all honest workers, which in addition
are positioned w.r.t. to other honest workers, they are i.i.d
random variables following the randomness of ξ and sat-
isfy a vector–wise variance bound (norm 2) E‖gr − gl‖ =
E‖gk − gl‖ = E‖gk − gr‖ ≤ E‖gk −G‖+ E‖G− gr‖ =
O(σ), where G is the unbiased estimator used by the hon-
est workers with a bounded variance such that, component–
wise (we divide by
√
d): E|But[i]− gk[i]| = O( σ√d ).
Proposition 2 proves that Bulyan(A ) reduces the
component–wise margin of an attacker, i.e. how much the
latter can deviate from honest workers component–wise,
while still be influencing the aggregated gradient.
A last natural question to be posed is: will Bulyan(A ) in-
troduce an additional bias in gradient estimations? The
answer, provided by Proposition 1, is no. We show that
Bulyan(A ) keeps the gradient estimation in the cone of an-
gle α around the true gradient. In particular, Bulyan(A ) is
also provably convergent.
Corollary 1. Let A be an (α, f)-Byzantine-resilient ag-
gregation rule used by Bulyan. Then Bulyan(A ) is also
(α, f)–Byzantine–resilient.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the (α, f)–
Byzantine–resilience ofA (Definition 1) and of the fact that
any vector used as an input to the last (averaging) step of
Bulyan already comes from the cone of angle α, since it
was selective by an iteration of A on a set of vectors of
cardinal ≥ 2 f + 2. Let g be the true gradient, a triangle
inequality applied between g, Bu and the β terms coming
from the iterations of A, call them Ak, k = 1, · · ·β gives:
‖Bu − g‖ ≤ 1β ‖Ak − g‖. Given how A ’s iterations are
performed (without re-sampling ξ), the Ak are themselves
i.id and by taking the E on the inequality, every term in
the sum of the right-hand side is bounded by ‖g‖ · sin(α)
(since it lives in the cone of angle α around g. Therefore:
‖EBu− g‖ ≤ ‖g‖ · sin(α) which means that EBu is also
a vector in the cone of angle α around g. The proof on
the statistical moments is obtained with same steps above
(except of bounding with E‖G‖r ’s instead of sin(α) · ‖g‖
Finally, even if the focus of our work was rather on nar-
rowing the leeway of Byzantine workers which we argue
is a more powerful requirement than (α, f)–Byzantine–
resilient alone. It is worth mentioning that as a conse-
quence of our results, convergence is ensured for Bulyan.
Corollary 2 (Convergence). With Bulyan(A ), the se-
quence of models xt adopted by the master almost surely
converges to a region where∇Q(x) = 0
Proof. As a consequence of Proposition 1, Bulyan is also
(α, f)–Byzantine–resilient, by Proposition 2 of (Blanchard
et al., 2017) guarantees almost sure convergence.
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5. Evaluation
We implemented the three (α, f)–Byzantine–resilient gra-
dient aggregation rules presented in Section 2.3, along with
the attack introduced in Section 3. We report in this section
on the actual impact this attack can have, on the MNIST
and CIFAR–10 problems, despite the use of such aggrega-
tion rules. Then, we evaluate the impact of Bulyan com-
pared to these gradient aggregation rules. Finally, we ex-
hibit the cost, in terms of convergence speed, of using
Bulyan in a Byzantine–free setup.
5.1. Overview of the studied models
MNIST. We use a fully connected, feed–forward network
with 784 inputs, 1 hidden layer of size 100, for a total of
d ≈ 8 ·104 free parameters. The hidden layers use rectified
linear units only. The output layer uses softmax.
CIFAR–10. We use a convolutional network with the fol-
lowing 7–layers architecture: input 32 × 32 × 3, convolu-
tional (kernel–size: 3× 3, 16 maps, 1 stride), max–pooling
of size 3 × 3, convolutional (kernel–size: 4 × 4, 64 maps,
1 stride), max–pooling of size 4 × 4, two fully connected
layers composed of 384 and 192 rectified linear units re-
spectively, and softmax is used on the output layer. This
model totals 106 free parameters. The hidden layers use
rectified linear units. The output layer uses softmax.
The maximum cross entropy loss function is used for both
models. L2–regularization of value 10−4 is used for both
models, and both use the Xavier weight initialization al-
gorithm. We use a fading learning rate η (epoch) =
η0
rη
epoch+rη
. The initial learning rate η0, the fading rate
rη , and the mini–batch size depend on each experiment.
The accuracy is always measured on the testing set.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. ATTACK ON BRUTE, KRUM AND GEOMED
Figures 2 and 3 shows the impact of our attack on the ag-
gregation rules presented in Section 2.3. The average rule
computes the arithmetic mean of the submitted gradients.
On MNIST, we use η0 = 1, rη = 10000, a batch size of 83
images (256 for Brute), and for the worker counts:
Krum/GeoMed 30 non–Byzantines + 27 Byzantines
Brute 6 non–Byzantines + 5 Byzantines
Average 30 non–Byzantines + 0 Byzantines
On CIFAR–10, we use η0 = 0.1, rη = 2000, a batch size
of 128 images (256 for Brute), and for the worker counts:
Krum/GeoMed 21 non–Byzantines + 18 Byzantines
Brute 6 non–Byzantines + 5 Byzantines
Average 21 non–Byzantines + 0 Byzantines
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Figure 2. MNIST: accuracy on the testing set up to epoch 1000,
comparing the presented aggregation rules under our attack. The
attack was maintained only up to epoch 50 (dotted line). The
average is the reference: it is the accuracy the model would have
shown if only non–Byzantine gradients had been selected.
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Figure 3. CIFAR–10: accuracy on the testing set up to epoch
1000, comparing the presented aggregation rules under our attack.
The average is the reference: it is the accuracy the model would
have shown if only non–Byzantine gradients had been selected.
In Figure 2, the attack is maintained only up to 50 epochs.
As shown, and except for Brute, this short attack phase at
the beginning of the learning process is sufficient to put the
parameter vector in a sub–space of ineffective models that
SGD did not succeed in leaving for at least 950 epochs. In
Figure 3, the attack is never stopped. Only Brute preserved
the accuracy. Krum suffered a 33% decrease at epoch 1000,
and GeoMed failed to produce a useful model.
Higher learning rates and lower batch sizes naturally ex-
tend the effectivity of our attack, by increasing both
its exploratory capabilities and the variance of the non–
Byzantine submissions. The supplementary material, in
Section C.1, presents slightly different initial parameters,
for which the attack completely prevented any learning.
5.2.2. THE EFFECT OF BULYAN
Figures 4 and 5, respectively for MNIST and CIFAR–10,
compares Krum, GeoMed and Bulyan (with A = Krum).
On MNIST, we use η0 = 1 (η0 = 0.2 for the upper graph),
rη = 10000, and a mini–batch size of 83 images. On
CIFAR–10, we use η0 = 0.25, rη = 2000, and a mini–
batch size of 128 images. For both MNIST and CIFAR–10,
we use 30 non–Byzantines + 9 Byzantines workers. Brute
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Figure 4. MNIST: accuracy on the testing set up to 500 epochs for
Krum, GeoMed, Bulyan (A = Krum) rules. This graph illustrates
the impact of the learning rate, as described in Section 3.1.
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Figure 5. CIFAR–10: accuracy on the testing set up to 1000
epochs for Krum, GeoMed, Bulyan (A = Krum) rules. The arith-
metic mean of non–Byzantine gradients serves as reference.
cannot be used with that many workers, see Section 2.3.1.
In Figure 4, with η0 = 1, Krum and GeoMed fail to prevent
the attack from pushing the model into an ineffective state,
despite the reduced proportion of Byzantine workers from
roughly 1/2, in Figure 2, to roughly 1/4. With η0 = 0.2,
Krum and GeoMed support the attack, at the cost of a use-
lessly slower learning process. Here, Bulyan is not affected
by the attack, and achieves the same accuracy as if it av-
erages only the non–Byzantine gradients. In Figure 5, we
do the same experiment with CIFAR–10. As with MNIST,
only Bulyan is not affected by our attack.
5.2.3. THE COST OF BULYAN
For both MNIST and CIFAR–10, we use the same config-
uration as in the experiments of Section 5.2.2.
In Figure 6, we study the cost of using Bulyan, in terms
of convergence speed, when there is actually no adversary.
We define the convergence speed, for a given mini–batch
size, as the accuracy the model reaches at a fixed, arbitrary
epoch. We use the average, i.e. the arithmetic mean of the
submitted gradients, as the reference aggregation rule.
Without Byzantine workers, the loss in convergence speed
induced by Bulyan is minimized with a reasonable batch
size: 24 images/batch for MNIST, and 36 for CIFAR–10.
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Figure 6. MNIST (left), CIFAR–10 (right): Accuracy on the test-
ing set at epoch 250 for Average and Bulyan. There are n = 39
workers and no adversary, but f is declared to 9. This shows
the trade–off between the Byzantine robustness of Bulyan and the
loss in convergence speed it introduces.
6. Concluding remarks
At first glance, the Byzantine–failure model might seem
specific to distributed computing, and too pessimistic in a
general ML context, for it assumes that some workers ac-
tively try to fool SGD towards the worst possible direction.
In fact, we argue that this failure model is also relevant for
poisoning attacks on single machines, as well as learning
with unreliable data in a centralized, single–worker setting.
For instance, even when there is no group of workers whose
estimated gradients are aggregated, an SGD update is still
an attempt to aggregate knowledge from data and update
the model subsequently. Consider a centralized, single
learner, drawing data from a distribution containing a frac-
tion of corrupt samples. The 0.5 breakdown limit for un-
biased estimators, initially formulated (Rousseeuw, 1985)
without computability considerations, establishes a formal
limit to poisoning attacks: they are impossible to counter if
at least half of the data is not i.i.d from the (desired) train-
ing distribution, even with a convex cost function in small
dimensions. In very high dimensions, and with highly–
non convex cost functions, our work shows that the in-
augural distributed–computing defenses (Blanchard et al.,
2017; Chen et al., 2017; Su, 2017) against poisoning at-
tacks, tough provably converging, remain frail in the face
of curse of dimensionality attacks. They might indeed con-
verge, as promised, but to the worst possible region. To de-
fend against that, we introduce Bulyan, which we theoret-
ically prove to significantly reduce the adversarial leeway
that causes this drift to sub–optimal models.
We empirically show that Bulyan, indeed avoids conver-
gence to ineffectual models, and instead, ends up learning
models that are comparable to a reasonable benchmark: a
non–attacked averaging scheme. However, the question
of finding “the best direction” possible for non–convex
cost functions remains one of the most challenging ones
in optimization for machine learning (Choromanska et al.,
2015b), especially when we stick to such a cheap, first–
order method as SGD, and avoid expensive, Hessian–like,
computations as pointed out by (Reddi et al., 2017).
It is important to recall that our approach tackles what hap-
pens while training, with the goal of avoiding bad models
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due to poisoning attacks. We did not address the problem
of evasion attacks, i.e. attacking an already trained model
with adversarial inputs.
From a distributed computing point of view, there seems to
be two complementary views on robustness to be made: (1)
a coarse-grained robustness (quality of the gradient aggre-
gation scheme), and (2) a fine-grained robustness (quality
of the model w.r.t single parameters). For the first view,
the unit of failure would be a single machine, hosting a
copy of the model (or significant parts of it) and attacked
in its attempt to estimate gradients. For the second view,
the models used by ML, neural networks for example, can
themselves be viewed as distributed computing objects (Pi-
uri, 2001), where the units of failure are individual neurons
and weight values. The question was explored (Kerlirzin,
1994) in the 1990s with unexpected connections with to-
days’ popular tools such as the dropout algorithm, which
was initially derived with a (distributed computing) fault-
tolerance purpose (Kerlirzin & Vallet, 1993), then indepen-
dently re-discovered as a robust regularization scheme to
reduce over-fitting 20 years latter (Srivastava et al., 2014).
Recently, this gap-bridging between robustness from the
distributed computing point of view, and robustness, from
a learning performance perspective is being revived, with
questions such as: how much error will be forward propa-
gated if units of the model are erroneous?
Recently, NVIDIA investigated (a closely related state-
ment of) the question through experimental lenses (Li
et al., 2017). In the mean time, theoretical evaluations of
this propagated error were derived with a tight bound (El
Mhamdi & Guerraoui, 2016; 2017; El Mhamdi et al., 2017)
which relies on computing the Lipschitz coefficient of the
neural network and proving its exponential dependency
with the depth. A similar (exponential in the depth) pat-
tern has been derived while investigating robustness (to
evasion attacks (Cisse et al., 2017)). We argue that poi-
soning attacks should be studied both from a fine-grained,
and coarse-grained perspective. For instance, the curse of
dimensionality attack (Section 3) is an example of a coarse-
grained problem (the whole system being wrong about the
model) arising from a fine-grained (single-parameter) at-
tack. An interesting question can therefore be posed: given
bounds on how much an error in an individual weight value
can influence the output of a model, can we compute the
impact of a poisoning attack of one single component of
the gradient? Subsequently, could this link be leveraged to
discover the theoretical limits of any defense against poi-
soning?
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A. Brute’s (α, f)–Byzantine–resilience proof
A.1. Background
Definition 2 ((α, f)–Byzantine–resilience).
Let (n, f) ∈ (N∗)2 with n > f .
Let (α, f) ∈ [0, pi/2]× [0 .. n] be any angle and any integer.
Let (V1 . . . Vn−f ) ∈
(
Rd
)n−f
be independent, identically
distributed random vectors, with Vi ∼ G and E[G] = G.
Let (B1 . . . Bf ) ∈
(
Rd
)f
be random vectors, possibly de-
pendent between them and the vectors (V1 . . . Vn−f ).
Then, an aggregation ruleF is said to be (α, f)-Byzantine-
resilient if, for any 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jf ≤ n, the vector:
F = F
V1, . . . , B1︸︷︷︸
j1
, . . . , Bf︸︷︷︸
jf
, . . . , Vn

satisfies:
1. 〈E[F ] , G〉 ≥ (1− sinα) · ‖G‖2 > 0
2. ∀r ∈ { 2, 3, 4 } , E ‖F‖r is bounded above by a linear
combination of the terms E ‖G‖r1 · . . . · E ‖G‖rn−1 ,
with r1 + · · ·+ rn−1 = r.
A.2. Definition
Let (n, f) ∈ (N∗)2 with n ≥ 2f + 1.
Let (V1 . . . Vn−f ) ∈
(
Rd
)n−f
be independent, identically
distributed random vectors, with Vi ∼ G and E[G] = G.
Let (B1 . . . Bf ) ∈
(
Rd
)f
be random vectors, possibly de-
pendent between them and the vectors (V1 . . . Vn−f ).
Let ‖·‖p be the `p–norm, with p ∈ N∗ ∪ {+∞}.
Let Q = {V1 . . . Vn } be the set of submitted gradients.
Let R = {X | X ⊂ Q, |X | = n− f } be the set of all the
subsets of Q with a cardinality of n− f .
Let S = arg min
X∈R
(
max
(Vi,Vj)∈X 2
(
‖Vi − Vj‖p
))
.
Then, the aggregated gradient F = 1n−f
∑
V ∈S
V .
A.3. Proof
Let ∀ (i, j) ∈ [1 .. n− f ]2 , i 6= j be σ¯ , E ‖Vi − Vj‖p.
Under the assumption that 2 f σ¯ < (n− f) ‖G‖p, we will
prove that this rule is (α, f)–Byzantine–resilient.
Trivial case: ∀i ∈ [1 .. f ] , Bi /∈ S.
As the aggregated gradient F is the arithmetic mean of un-
biased vectors Vj , we have E[F ] = G, and points 1. and 2.
of definition 2 are trivially satisfied.
Otherwise, without loss of generality, let b ∈ [1 .. f ] and
S = {V1 . . . Vn−f−b, B1 . . . Bb }, R¯ = R \ S . It holds:
∀S¯ ∈ R¯, ∃Xi ∈ S¯ \ S, ∃Xj ∈ S¯ \ {Xi } ,
∀Xk ∈ S, ∀Xl ∈ S \ {Xk } ,
‖Xk −Xl‖p < ‖Xi −Xj‖p
We can also notice that: ∃V ∈ R¯, ∀i ∈ [1 .. f ] , Bi /∈ V .
Then, by combining this observation with the previous one:
∀a ∈ [1 .. b] , Ba ∈ S
⇒ ∃ (x, y) ∈ [1 .. n− f ]2 , i 6= j,
∀k ∈ [1 .. n− f − b] , ‖Ba − Vk‖p < ‖Vx − Vy‖p
This last observation will be reused in the following.
We can compute the aggregated gradient:
F =
1
n− f
(
n−f−b∑
i=1
Vi +
b∑
i=1
Bi
)
and compare it with the average of the non–Byzantine ones:
Ĝ =
1
n− f
n−f∑
i=1
Vi
F − Ĝ = 1
n− f
 b∑
i=1
Bi −
n−f∑
i=n−f−b+1
Vi

=
1
n− f
b∑
i=1
Bi − Vi+n−f−b
∥∥∥F − Ĝ∥∥∥
p
≤ 1
n− f
b∑
i=1
‖Bi − Vi+n−f−b‖p
≤ 1
n− f
b∑
i=1
(
‖Bi − Vk‖p
+ ‖Vk − Vi+n−f−b‖p
)
≤ 1
n− f
b∑
i=1
(
‖Vx − Vy‖p
+ ‖Vk − Vi+n−f−b‖p
)
We can then compute the expected value of this distance,
and with E
[
Ĝ
]
, G and the Jensen’s inequality:
‖E[F ]−G‖p ≤ E
∥∥∥F − Ĝ∥∥∥
p
≤ 1
n− f
b∑
i=1
σ¯ + σ¯
≤ 2 b σ¯
n− f ≤
2 f σ¯
n− f
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So, under the assumption that 2 f σ¯ < (n− f) ‖G‖p, we
verify that ‖E[F ]−G‖p < ‖G‖p, and so: 〈E[F ] , G〉 > 0.
Point 2. can also be verified formally, ∀r ∈ { 2, 3, 4 }:
E ‖F‖rp ≤
n− f − b
n− f E ‖G‖
r
p +
1
n− f
b∑
i=1
E ‖Bi‖rp
Then, by using the binomial theorem twice:
‖Bi‖rp ≤
∑
r1+r2=r
(
r
r1
)
‖Bi − Vk‖r1p ‖Vk‖r2p
with k ∈ [1 .. n− f − d]
‖Bi − Vk‖r1p ≤ ‖Vx − Vy‖r1p
≤
∑
r3+r4=r1
(
r1
r3
)
‖Vx‖r3p ‖Vy‖r4p
Finally, as (V1 . . . Vn−f ) are independent, identically dis-
tributed random variables following the same distribu-
tion G, we have that ∀ (i, j) ∈ [1 .. n− f ]2 , i 6= j,
E
[
‖Vi‖r1p ‖Vj‖r2p
]
= E ‖G‖r1p · E ‖G‖r2p , and so E ‖Bi‖rp
is bounded as described in point 2. of definition 2.
B. Approximation of αm, with p ∈ N∗
B.1. Prior conventions and assumptions
Let remind that ∀i ∈ [1 .. n− f ] , Vi =
(
v
(i)
1 . . . v
(i)
d
)
∼
G.
We model each coordinate as a normal distribution:
∀j ∈ [1 .. d] , ∃ (µj , σj) ∈ R2,
∀i ∈ [1 .. n− f ] , v(i)j ∼ N
(
µj , σj
2
)
We assume d 1, and we will write δ¯ for:
∀ (i, j) ∈ [1 .. n− f ]2 , i 6= j, δ¯ = 1
d
d∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣v(i)k − v(j)k ∣∣∣
=
2
d
√
pi
d∑
k=1
σk
and note that:
1
d
d∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣v(i)k − µk∣∣∣ = √2d√pi
d∑
k=1
σk
=
δ¯√
2
Then, ∀ (i, j) ∈ [1 .. n− f ]2 , i 6= j, we can approximate:
‖Vi − Vj‖p =
(
d∑
k=1
∣∣∣v(i)k − v(j)k ∣∣∣p
) 1
p
≈ (d δ¯p) 1p
Let E = (0 . . . 0, 1, 0 . . . 0) ∈ Rd the attacked coordinate.
Then, with αm > 0, B = V +αmE, we can approximate:
‖B − Vi‖p =
((
d∑
k=1
∣∣∣v(i)k − v¯k∣∣∣p
)
−
∣∣∣v(i)e − v¯e∣∣∣p + ∣∣∣v(i)e − v¯e + αm∣∣∣p) 1p
≈
(
αm
p +
d∑
k=1
∣∣∣v(i)k − µk∣∣∣p
) 1
p
≈
(
αm
p + d
(
δ¯√
2
)p) 1p
B.2. Attack against Brute
We only study the worst case scenario, where n = 2f + 1,
maximizing the proportion of Byzantine workers.
Assuming B is selected by Brute:
B ∈ S
⇒ ∃ (x, y) ∈ [1 .. n− f ]2 , i 6= j,
∀k ∈ [1 .. n− f − b] , ‖B − Vk‖p < ‖Vx − Vy‖p
 
(
αm
p + d
(
δ¯√
2
)p) 1p
<
(
d δ¯p
) 1
p
 αm <
((
1− 1√
2
p
)
d
) 1
p
δ¯
This is a necessary, approximated condition. It is only to
give broad insights on the relation between some hyper–
parameters and αm: with p, q constants, αm = O
(
δ¯ p
√
d
)
.
B.3. Attack against Krum/GeoMed
We only study the worst case scenario, where n = 2f + 3,
maximizing the proportion of Byzantine workers.
Let q ∈ { 1, 2 }, q = 1 for GeoMed and q = 2 for Krum.
First, we approximate the Byzantine submission’s score:
s (B) ≈ 2 ‖B − Vi‖qp
≈ 2
(
αm
p + d
(
δ¯√
2
)p) qp
∀i ∈ [1 .. n− f ], let b ∈ [0 .. f ] be how many B belongs to
the n− f − 2 closest vectors to Vi. Then the score of Vi is:
s (Vi) ≈ b ‖B − Vi‖qp + (f + 1− b) ‖Vj − Vi‖qp
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≈ b
(
αm
p + d
(
δ¯√
2
)p) qp
+ (f + 1− b) (d δ¯p) qp
Finally,B is selected ⇒ ∀i ∈ [1 .. n− f ] , s (B) / s (Vi)
⇒
↑
∀i
(2− b)
(
αm
p + d
(
δ¯√
2
)p) qp
/ (f + 1− b) (d δ¯p) qp
⇒
↑
∃i
αm /
((
f + 1− b
2− b
) p
q
− 1√
2
p
) 1
p
d
1
p δ¯
This last implication is always true: there must be at least
one non–Byzantine vector Vj for with b ∈ { 0, 1 }; else αm
could increase unbounded, which would be absurd.
In conclusion, with p, q constants: αm = O
(
δ¯ q
√
f p
√
d
)
.
C. Supplementary experiments
C.1. Attack on Brute, Krum and GeoMed
On MNIST, here we use η0 = 1, rη = 10000, a batch size
of 83 images (256 for Brute), and for the workers:
Krum/GeoMed 30 non–Byzantines + 27 Byzantines
Brute 6 non–Byzantines + 5 Byzantines
Average 30 non–Byzantines + 0 Byzantines
On CIFAR–10, we use η0 = 0.5, rη = 2000, a batch size
of 128 images (256 for Brute), and for the worker counts:
Krum/GeoMed 21 non–Byzantines + 18 Byzantines
Brute 6 non–Byzantines + 5 Byzantines
Average 21 non–Byzantines + 0 Byzantines
In Figure 7, the attack is maintained only up to 50 epochs.
The attack variant for `∞ norm–based gradient aggregation
rules exhibited a very strong impact. None of the presented
gradient aggregation rules prevented the stochastic gradient
descent from being pushed and remaining in a sub–space of
ineffective models, and for at least 1000 epochs.
In Figure 8, the attack is never stopped. Again, none of the
presented gradient aggregation rules prevented the stochas-
tic gradient descent from being pushed and remaining in a
sub–space of ineffective models, for at least 1000 epochs.
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Figure 7. MNIST: accuracy on the testing set up to epoch 1000,
comparing the presented aggregation rules under our attack. The
attack was maintained only up to epoch 50 (dotted line). The
average is the reference: it is the accuracy the model would have
shown if only non–Byzantine gradients had been selected.
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Figure 8. CIFAR–10: accuracy on the testing set up to epoch
1000, comparing the presented aggregation rules under our attack.
The average is the reference: it is the accuracy the model would
have shown if only non–Byzantine gradients had been selected.
